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 Recently, there are some arguments on vertical integration of large corporate 
firms. Most of cinema are multiplexes, and they allocate more times and 
screens to blockbuster movie compared to small size movie. This 
phenomenon comes from profit maximization of multiplex and distributor 
when they are vertically integrated.   
 I'll try to look on the effect on sales and the existence of the vertical 
integration. For doing that, first I'll show the circumstance and environment of 
multiplex and distribution channel of movie in Korea. Then explain 
characteristic of data and how I dealt with it. Then I'll estimate the effect of 
collusion using regression. Also I go through that the groups give favor to 
each other by allocating more screen and times to the each other’s film. 
 Most of researches about movie industry in Korea are focused on Screen 
Quota policy analysis, and relatively poor in other research. This paper deals 
with demand sides and the effect of collusion in movie industry. And for 
studying on structure of movie industry, it will have its own meaning. 
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At 1998, the action movie named <Swiri> came out and draw huge 
attraction from all of South Korea.  It recorded as the highest number of 
audience watched until that time, breaking the record of the movie ‘Titanic’. 
Before ‘Swiri’, Korean movie had been limited in size and genre, like comedy 
or romance drama because these movie genres required low investment and 
had opportunity of high profit. At that time, most of action blockbuster 
movies are from Hollywood and people thought that Korean movie industry 
could not make these types of movie. But ‘Swiri’ broke these ideas and made 
a huge success. From that, movie industry has grown rapidly and changed a 
lot. 
Movie became one of the most popular ways of spending free time in 
Korea and as a results, the number of audience has increased rapidly, 
connected to increase in market size of industry.  In 2000 the number of 
screen was 720 and in 2011 it was 1974 so almost 3 times increased. Also 
market share of Korean movie in admissions increased from 24.7% in 2000 to 
51% in 2011.  
As the size of movie market became larger, corporate groups entered 
the movie industry. These groups took an aggressive strategy to expand their 
business based on large capital. This strategy made successful results, as CJ 
group has grown as a market leader followed by Lotte both in distribute and 
screen market. Orion group originally owned Showbox/mediaplex in 
distribute market and megabox in screen market, but they sold megabox to 
Macquarie in 2008 so they focus on distribute market now.     
Entry of corporate group resulted from a unique characteristic of 
movie industry compared to other industry: high risk, high return. A movie is 
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experience good, which cannot be known the quality of good before they 
watch the movie. Also movie’s success doesn’t depend on the amount of 
investment, so that even if a lot of money invested to movie, few audiences go 
to movie, while small size movie can make huge sales. It is the reason that 
movie Production Company has difficulty on investment. We will see this 
later, but in Korea, distribute companies also take a role of investor, because 
they can manage risks and be funded from abundant capital.
1
 
These corporate groups, however, have high market shares in both 
distributed and screening market, there can be vertical integration. CJ 
entertainment and Lotte have 55% of market share in distribute market and 60% 
in screen market. This means that incentives for vertical integration of 2 firms 
are high and according to report of Fair Trade Committee, there have been 
unfair trade done by these 2 firms related to vertical integration.  
This paper summarize the environment of distribute market and 
screen market, and then look up the behavior of cinema in both case where 
cinema and distributor are owned by same group and the other. Then estimate 
the equation using film level data, focusing on the monopolistic behavior of 
corporate group. 
II. Literature review 
 
About the fairness in movie industry, there are researches done by 
Fair trade committee and KOFIC. Fair trade committee made overall 
researches about movie industry and also they investigate the violation of 
cinema and distributor. The violation of cinema includes discrimination for 
                                           
1
 The average of return of investment of Korean films is -4.6% in 2011 and -11% in 
2010. Only 25% of film reached its BEP and 9 films of 65 records over 100% ROI in 
2011. 
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the distributor of same group, finishing movie early, exaggeration in 
commercial and unfair contract about profit division rate between cinema and 
distributor. In case of distributor, they discriminate for cinema owned by same 
group and collusion in price. As the market shares of top 3 companies in 
distribute and screen market is high, it is easy to become vulnerable to unfair 
trade. 
KOFIC also made research about market structure and the effect of 
vertical integration in large company. Ryu(2006) studied market share of 
distribute and screen market using data from 2000 to 2005. He found that in 
distributed market, the concentration level of 3 major groups-CJ, Lotte, 
Showbox- isn’t high as each firm’s market share is about 20% and sum of 3 
firms is about 59%. But if we consider only the Korean movie, sum of market 
share is 87.6%, which means that the concentration level of 3 firms is 
significantly high and they held high market power. He pointed out that in 
Korean movie, as the movie industry has high risk high return characteristic, 
it’s hard to find investor outside so the distributors become major investor 
also. And these firms raise the distributed fee rate and production manage fee 
and lower the investment rate, which means lower the risk and raise their own 
profit. However, this raise the risk of other investor so it makes harder to draw 
investor outside so 3 major distributors reinforce their market power. 
Jihoo Kim(2011) analyses the illegal action and unfair trade in 
distributing and screening market. He pointed out that sales in screening 
market and Secondary market, such as home video or online download, has 
significant different; Sales in screening market owns 88.13& and only 11.87% 
goes to Secondary markets. And in film industry, large firm prefer to have 








Also there is research about fairness awareness answered by 
employee in movie industry. <Table 1> shows the result from the survey by 
employee in film industry. In distribute market and screen market, people said 
there are discrimination between their own group and other company. They 
answered that cinemas discriminate in the number of screen, the size of screen, 
the decision of release date, and the decision of running time and when movie 
finish. Most unfair part is the number and size of screen, followed by the 
decision of running time and when the movie finish, the decision of release 
date, etc. Also there are minimum screening period for protecting small size 
movie and distributor, but people answered that cinemas don’t obey the rule. 
Overall, people thought that movie industry is unfair in business and have to 
make standard contract form and watch for discrimination. 
 
                                           
2 현대리서치, 영화산업 공정도 인식도 조사, P.16, 2012 




492 67.3 24.8 3 4.9 26.5




492 55.7 32.9 2.6 8.7 29.1
Running
period
492 83.7 10.6 1.2 4.5 17.9
Marketing 492 73.8 18.5 3 4.7 24.4
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III. Structure of Movie industry 
 




<Figure 1> Number of firms in movie industry 
 
<Figure 1> shows the number of firms included in movie industry 
from 2002 to 2011. We can find that the number of production and distribute 
company has been increased, and if we compare to 2002, it increased twice in 
number, even though some firms didn’t notice when they stop running so data 
can be different with real one. The number of cinema didn’t changed a lot, but 
the number of screen has been increased. This is because that small cinemas, 
which had 1~3 screens, closed and multiplex, which had 6~7 screens on 
average, opened. Multiplexes are usually located in shopping center and have 
other entertain place, such as recreation room or cafe, and the profit of 
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multiplex is much higher than small cinema. In case of small cinema, they 
close or specialize in films they show, such as artistic film or film of other 
sector (Europe, Latino, Asian, etc.). 
<Table 2> shows the sales and incomes in different part in film 
industry. The Sales of screening markets has 47.5% of total sales and 
distribution market has 11.87% and production market records 14.17%. In 
terms of net income, screening and distribution market records 53514 mils 
won and 15179 mils won and production market record -1983 mils won: 
screening markets has the highest return and sales. So the firms focus on the 
screening and distribution of film. 
The film industry has its own characteristic: Economic of scale and 
Economic of scope. First, the cost of producing film decreases by mass 
production and consumption, and film can be easily copied so supplies can be 
increases. Second it can produce different types of film using same operating 
systems and process. This can help films can go to secondary markets and 
reproduce profits. And these characteristic makes company try to own several 
different firm in different market; they can diversify their profits and lower 
risks. Here we focus on distributing and screening market. 
 
2. .Distributing market  
 
(1) Firm profit 
 
There are 2 different way of distribute the film; direct distribution, 
indirect distribution. Direct distribution is that the distributor and cinema 
make a contract and they provide film directly, while indirect distribution is 
that the main distributor makes a contract with small local distributors and the 
7 
local distributor provides films to local cinema. A few foreign movie 
distributors use indirect and direct distribution but most of the Korean 
distributor use direct distribution only. 
Recently, distributors choose wide release distribution strategy, which 
is the distributor supplies films to cinema as many as possible and then they 
increase or decrease of number of cinema after the score of first week. This 
strategy has grown since multiplex became general. This can increase profits 
of movie but only to large distributor. As ‘blockbuster’ movies make ‘wide 
release’, small movies have no screen to run.  
Distributor is the one who takes movies from production and gives to 
cinema and takes some fee. This fee is call ‘Boo Rate’, which is the dividing 
ratio of profit between cinema and distributor when movie makes sales, and 
when distributor takes revenue, they took ‘distributing service charge’ from it 
and then transfer remain portion to product company. The profit of distributor 
depends on the sales of movie they distribute, so they want to distribute the 













(2) Market share  
 
 
<Figure 2-1> Market share of the number of films  
 
<Figure 2-2> Market share of box office of distribute firm 
 
<Figure 2> shows that distribute company’s data.
3
 First one shows 
                                           
3
 Using KOFIC data. It is online database which collects information about tickets  
when ticket is sold. Also they collect the information about movie including director, 
distributor, actors, etc.  
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how many film they distribute to cinema, second and third one shows market 
share of admissions and sales each. Market share of top 3 in the number of 
films is almost 35%,  but market share in admissions and sales takes 80% 




<Table 3> Distribute Market in 2011  
 
More specifically, <Table 3> shows market share of distribute in 
2011. 3 major distributor- CJ entertainments, Lotte Entertainment, 
Showbox/mediaplex, possess 83% of market share by sales and 83% of 
market share by admissions. About number of films, 26.7% of films belong to 
these 3 distributors. These distributors are owned by huge corporate group- CJ, 
Lotte, and Orion each. These groups have grown in the industry using their 
sufficient asset and network. If we only consider CJ and Lotte, market share 
of sales is 67% and market share of admissions is 67%.
4
 Especially, CJ has 
high market share in both. 
                                           
4 Orion doesn’t own their own cinema, because they sold cinema brand Megabox in 
2008, so Showbox/Mediaplex shows small amount compare to CJ and Lotte in 2011. 
They focus on distribution business and increasing their returns. 
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At 1990s, Screen industry was competitive market run by small local 
theater. A local theater has 2 or 3 screens and most of the movie was 
distributed by local distributor. They run theater flexible so they could choose 
what they would show and how long they would run. From late 1990s to early 
2000s, however, Korean movie market made a huge progress in size and the 
number of films. As the market grew, corporate group started to invest in the 
movie industry and participate in screen market. By large capital and asset, 
they introduced multiplex cinema which has more than 6 or 7 screens and 
located in shopping center so that they drew a lot of people easily. This is 
shown in previous section as the number of cinema hasn’t changed but the 
number of screens has been increased. 
First multiplex is opened by CJ, CJ CGV Gangbyeon, at april 1998, 
other corporate group enter the market. Megabox owned by Orion opened at 
2000 and Lotte open its own multiplex, Lotte cinema, at 2003 and these 3 
multiplex has competed each other. These multiplex own franchise most of 
regions and the number has been increased. These multiplexes run by own or 
make outsourcing contracts. 
The decision of ticket price depends on cinema itself but cinema 
decide price on almost same level. There can be difference depending on 
region or time that film are shown. Morning and Midnight has special 
discount, but the discount rate are not significantly different through cinemas. 
But they have their own discount, which can be categorized in 2 parts: Own 
discount factor and alliance with credit card company. Own discount factors 
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are time discount and membership mileage discount and it doesn’t vary across 
cinema. On the other hand, the discounts using alliance with Credit Card 
Company vary across cinema, because these depend upon the firm cinema 
ally with. But CJ CGV, Lotte cinema, and Megabox are owned by corporate 
group so they can easily ally with credit card Company, and this is one of the 
reasons these cinema has grown rapidly.  
Cinema makes most of sales by selling ticket. But they also have 
other sales, such as recreation room, cafe, and recreation room. <Table 4> 
shows the sales structure of multiplex. The share of these facilities in sales has 
raised and they make profit from screening commercial before they screen the 
film but most of the sales depend on ticket sales. So we can see that still firms 
try to run films that can sell more tickets. 
 
(2) Market share of cinema 
 
 
<Figure 3-1>the number of cinema sorted by brand 
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<Figure 3-2> the number of screen owned by cinema 
 
<Figure 3> shows that market shares of cinema in the number of 
cinema and screen. As I mention before the number of cinema hasn’t changed 
much. But first graph shows that the share of non-multiplex has decreased and 
market share of CJ and Lotte increased. Megabox seems stable but it merged 
with Cinus in 2010 as Megabox so the real share of Megabox goes high. Same 
explanation applied to market share of screen. As the number of screen of 
multiplex is high compare to non-multiplex cinema, so the ratio of non- 
multiplex in screen goes down rapidly. Also we can see the share of other 
multiplex in both has decreased, and this is because that these multiplex 
changed to franchise of top multiplex brands. By doing this, CJ, Lotte and 
Megabox can extend their market stable. 
<Table 5> shows the market share of cinema and screen in Korea on 
2010 and 2011. CGV and Lotte cinema are owned by Cj and Lotte each. 82% 
of cinema is multiplex and 93% of screen is included in multiplex on 2011. 
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As you can see most of the screen market is owned by multiplex and other 
form of cinema-mostly local theater- takes little proportion. Also almost 60% 
of cinema is run by CJ and Lotte and their share of screen is 67%. This means 
that the level of concentration is significantly high and these multiplexes own 
high market power. As sales of movie directly are affected by the number of 
screen, it is important for films to run at multiplex. 
 
4. Unfair trade in film market 
 
Until now, we see that screen market takes the large proportion of 
sales so the corporate firms want to show own films more than other films. 
There are several ways to achieve their goal. First, they cut off the films 
earlier without notice; cinema shows a film at least 2 weeks but multiplex 
didn’t follow the rule. Jihoo Kim(2011) found the corrective order from Fair 
Trade Committee that major multiplexes cut off movie in 6 days if movie was 
not distributed by major distributor. <Table 6> shows the cases of corrective 
orders from Fair Trade Committee. 
Also there is ‘Cross screening’; 2 films are shown in one screen 
crossly which is one films is shown and then other films shows next then 
repeat this. By this way, multiplex argue that they obey the rules but they can 
show their own films more. And multiplex allocate the morning or midnight 
times to films that is not famous or distributed by other firms. 
These unfair trades are problems in a long time. Recently movie 
<Touch> directed by Byeonghoon Min, suffers cross screening from the first 
day, and director Min accused multiplex as unfair trade to KOFIC( Korean 
Film Council) and declared he would finish screening of the film. The film 
was small size movie but audience rating was good and attracts many people 
14 
but it had no room for screening. In Seoul, only 3 cinemas showed the movie 
and most of case it shows one day in a week.
5
 This is not the case. The film 
‘Pieta’ directed by Kiduk Kim(2012) also suffer from cross screening even 
though it won the Golden lion in the 69th Venice International Film Festival. 
This is problem that reduces diversities in films and deprives creativeness in 
movie industry.  
 
IV. Model for vertical integration 
 
In this paper we concentrate the behavior of cinema, which gives 
favor to own group. As we notice, most behavior adjusted the number of 
screen and how many times film has shown. Here we tried to see this. 
P denotes price of tickets and Q is total number of audience measured 
by the number of ticket sold. But cinema only takes δ percent of the sales, 
cause (1-δ) goes to distributor and distributor takes distribute fee λ.  
As we saw previous section, price of ticket is almost same across 
cinema, so we denote price as fixed. And then divide Q in 2 parts: one is the 
audience watching the film that distributed by their own group and the other. 
For simplicity, I assume 2 product, 1 is distributed by own group and 2 is the 
other. We denote as below 
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http://star.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/OhmyStar/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A00
01803292, (‘교차상영으로 사라지는 숱한 한국영화들, 그 해법은?’, 오마이뉴
스, 2010.11.17) 
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(1) Q =  +          
And the number of audience depends on the quality and strategy of 
cinema. Here, I assume 2 strategies, how many times movie have shown and 
the number of screen, each denote RC and NC. We denote this as below 




So the maximization of cinema is different whether they are in 
corporate group or not. If the cost of cinema is C, we can write profit 
maximization problem as below. 
 
(5) Max δ·P·   – C  
(6) Max δ·P·   – C + λ·(1-δ)·P·  
 
Equation (1) is maximization of normal cinema and equation (2) is 
maximization of corporate group which owns cinema and distribute company 
both. 
For simplicity, we assume that RC and NC is one. Also price is one 
too. Then we can solve profit maximization problem using equation (2) and (3) 


















So cinema doesn’t have incentive to give favor depending on 
distributor. Then we solve the equation (2) and the results came as below. 
 
(9)  ,  
(10)  ,  
 
So cinema has incentives to show film that distributed by own group 
more and many times. By doing this, cinema can maximize its own profit. So 
we will see this results hold in empirical test. 
 




The Korean Film Council (KOFIC), entrusted by the Ministry of 
Culture, Sports and Tourism, Republic of Korea, aiming to support and 
promote Korean films, collects most of data related to movie industry in 
Korea. They construct the database ‘KOBIS (Korea Box office Information 
System)’. Kobis is connected to cinema: when a ticket is sold, information 
17 
goes to database directly. These informations provide the data of sales, the 
number of audience, screen and seat, and market share of screen and seat of 
each film. Also Kobis collect data of actor, Production Company, distributor, 
price and most of information about movie. .Here we use sales, the number of 
audience, the number of screen and how many times are shown (denote 
running count). In case of the number of screen and running count, there are 
both aggregate data and cinema level data. 
We also use production cost and rating from audience and critics each. 
In case of production cost, I use the information of the media, which 
production company gives to press. It includes articles, advertisement and 
interview.
6
 And rating information came from the Rating site, and usually 
came from Naver. Naver Movie owns the largest database in rating so I 
choose Naver as standard.
7
  
<Table 7> shows the average value of each data sorted by distributor 
in 2010 and 2011. As we can see, average sales of CJ and Showbox didn’t 
different much and Lotte and NEW also seems similar in sales and admissions. 
Showbox is owned by Orion, which is a large corporate group, so they can 
invest much but NEW is not owned by large group and they show significant 
results. Also NEXT seems competitive with other distributor. So we can say 
that capability among distributor isn’t different much. 
 
 
                                           
6
 Production cost consists of 2 parts: original production cost and marketing cost. 
Here, I use total production cost; marketing cost increases as original production cost 
and also marketing is one of the reason that people decide to watch the films.   
7
 Rating from audience is available in movie webzines and other reservation sites but 
most of case they have similar rating.  
18 
2. Model  
 
First I find the relation between sales and major distributors. To see 
this, make an equation below 
. 
(1)       =
                                               
                      
 
Production cost measured the size of film and Rating measure the 
quality of movie. DD is dummy variable that if the distributor has cinema in 
its own group. Here, CJ and Lotte have both distribute firms and cinema so 
they have value 1. Otherwise, the value is 0. But this only gives what 
characteristics effect on the sales of film, cannot be proof for discrimination 
of cinema. So to find the effect of vertical integration, I estimate other 
equation below. 
To see the relation between cinema and distributor, I use the data 
which cinema the film has shown and how many time film has shown. Below 
is the equation. 
 
(2)     =                  
    =                  
 
(3)        =                                 
       =                                
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J represents film and c represents cinema and        are fixed 
factors of the film and cinema each, and submitting these dummy to control 
the effect of film and cinema, which the effects of film itself captured by    
and the effects of cinema captured by   .      measures the effect of 
corporate group, which is 1 if the movie is distributed and shown by same 
group at the same time and 0 otherwise.           is the dummy that if one 
corporate group which owns both distribute and cinema are shown in the 
cinema which is owned by other corporate group holing distribute firm at the 
same time. In this case if the film distributed by Lotte is shown at CGV or the 
film distributed by CJ entertainment shown at Lotte cinema,           has 
1 and 0 otherwise. This has 2 meaning: first, we can see whether these 
corporate groups compete with each other or not and second the effect of 
vertical integration of cinema and distributor can be detected more accurately. 
If the    is negative, they show other group’s film less each other, while if 
the value is positive, they show each other’s film more than independent 
distributor. 
Equation (2) estimate the effect of running count and the number of 
screen and equation (3) shows the increment in running count and the number 
of screen when the distributor and cinema has been vertically integrated. 
Equation (3) can be rewrite as following. 
 
(3)'     =  
          1      2                        
    =  
          1      2                       
 
By equation (3) and (3)’, if dummy goes to 1, exponential of    can 
be measured and it is increment of effect when there are vertical integration 
20 
between distributor and cinema. Also the effect of competition between 





<Table 8> Estimation equation (1)  
 
First, I estimate the equation (1) for seeing the relation between sales 
and corporate group. As I mention before, dummy variable measures the 
relationship between distributor and cinema if they are owned by same 
corporate group. Column 1 in <Table 8>, Rating from audience and critics 
affects to sales, especially rating from audience is high as 0.724, which is 
plausible results thinking that before people choose what to watch they search 
for comments from audiences. And the coefficient of production cost is 
significantly high as 1.24. This seems also plausible that if the production cost 
is high, it means that it invested a lot of resources to the film so the firms want 
to earn more sales. 
The coefficient of dd is 0.414 which shows positive relation between 
sales and group. This can be seen that large corporate group choose more 
profitable films so they can make more sales. Even the data sorted by 
distribute firms show that there are little difference between large firm and 
others so the dd can be seen as proof for discrimination, but to be accurate, 














coefficient 0.414 1.241 0.724 0.389
st err 0.096 0.136 0.278 0.166





  coeffecient st err Coeffecient st err 
DD 0.40  0.04  0.10  0.01  






<Table 9> Estimation of Equation (2) 
 
Equation (2) estimates the effect of corporate group, using film level 
data. In case of Runcount, the coefficient is 0.4 and mean of dependent 
variable is 0.22 so cinema shows the film distributed by integrated distributor 
more than other films. Mean dependent variable is 0.22 so this can mean that 
cinema shows the films distributed by same groups almost twice more than 
other films. Also the number of screen has high correlation with dummy, 
compared to mean of dependent variable, that coefficient is 0.1, which can be 
seen that cinema gives 1.5 times more screen to its own films. So we can say 
that if cinema and distribute firm is owned by same group, they have incentive 
to show more times on many screen. Also ‘DD compete’ has high positive 
coefficient, 0.34 in runcount and 0.09 in the number of screen, so that it shows 
corporate groups show each other’s film more-this is little bit smaller than its 
own films but highly significant so that it can be seen that corporate groups 






Log coeffecient st err coeffecient st err 
C 2.83  0.41  0.57  0.29  
DD 0.75  0.12  0.66  0.08  
Exp(dd) 2.11  1.93  
DD compete 0.50  0.15  0.49  0.10  
Exp(dd compete) 1.65  1.63  
 
<Table 10> Log estimation of Equation (3) and (3)’ 
 
<Table 10> shows the estimation using log variable. Coefficient of 
DD is high and exp(dd) is 2.11 in Runcount and 1.93 in Nscreen, which 
means that when dd is 1, runcount increase 111% and the number of screen 
increase 93%, which is significantly high. And the coefficient of DD compete 
has 0.5 and 0.49, which is highly significant coefficient and it shows that they 
show 65% more and give 63% more screens than other films. We can tell that 
corporate group gives favor each other so they can make more profits again. It 
is same results with the research of Fair Trade Committee which reports the 











      We see that there is discrimination in movie industry and it comes 
from vertical integration in distributor and cinema. This paper only sees the 
number of screen and how many times movie are shown, but there are other 
unfair treatments in industry, such as decision of release date and end date. 
This can be hard to measure because data are not available, but if we can 
estimate the effect it can make behavior more clear. 
And variables vary considerably in quantity. And this shows that there 
are possibilities that there can be unfairness depending on genre of movies. 
And it goes to decrease in diversity and in the end; it can reduce welfare of 
audience. 
Also independent variables affecting sales are hard to measure so 
research cannot go further. And there can be endogenous problem in sales and 
dummies but it is hard to find instrumental variable. If an instrumental 
variable can be set up, research can be more abundant.  
However, the results match the expectation and explain the behavior of 
firms so this is what this paper aimed at first place. Next goal is that find ways 
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  Investment Production Import Production 
assist 
Distribution Screening Marketing Secondary 
market 
Sales(mil won) 49,486 506,823 416,852 168,506 424,583 1,699,683 158,537 153,478 
Precentage 1.38% 14.17% 11.65% 4.71% 11.87% 47.50% 4.43% 4.29% 
Gross Profit   91,892 81,308 81,172 82,386 1,020,029 92,480   
Operating income 7,546 7,616 9,239 27,186 207,699 188,387   
Ordinary income   -906 -1,153 -285 17,225 63,354 10,411   
Net income   -1,983 -1,438 -464 15,179 53,514 9,168   
 














                                           










Case number Name of Case Defendant Case 
2007제일4177 Status abuse of 
CJ CGV in trade 
CJ CGV From 2004 to 2007, 29 films contracting with 16 
distributor is over in 6 days without notice 
2007제일4169 Status abuse of 
Lotte in trade 
Lotte From 2004 to 2007, 26 films contracting with 17 
distributor is over in 6 days without notice 
2007제일4170 Status abuse of 
Megabox in trade 
Megabox From 2004 to 2007, 169 films contracting with 11 
distributor is over in 6 days without notice 
2007제일4178 Status abuse of 
Primus in trade 
Primus From 2004 to 2007, 140 films contracting with 35 
distributor is over in 6 days without notice 
 




















CJ Entertainment 1.00 16.65% 35,421 17.66% 1,558,592 ₩11,660,709,542.86 44.05
Shobox 0.00 20.64% 35,744 17.81% 1,491,227 ₩11,130,786,173.33 60.43
NEW 0.00 18.95% 31,642 18.92% 1,131,822 ₩8,212,859,225.00 33.80
Next 0.00 15.29% 27,727 18.95% 1,032,808 ₩7,748,647,562.50 17.43
Lotte 1.00 15.96% 28,844 15.29% 1,000,838 ₩7,286,527,240.00 40.54
Cinema Service 0.00 15.96% 28,346 16.70% 809,330 ₩6,055,114,833.33 14.77
Sinergy 0.00 13.32% 22,902 12.77% 532,768 ₩3,938,144,800.00 26.64
FNH 0.00 14.81% 20,543 10.73% 505,357 ₩3,744,456,222.22 25.14
Others 0.01 1.65% 1,642 7.67% 39,462 ₩289,900,258.71 8.80




1990년대 후반부터 등장한 멀티플렉스는 영화 산업의 수직계열화를 
초래하는 결과를 가져왔다. 이는 전반적으로 성장한 영화산업과 
함께 많은 문제점을 야기하고 있다. 특히 배급시장과 
상영시장에서의 수직계열화는 자사의 배급 영화에 편의를 주게 
함으로써 다른 배급사의 영화가 차별을 받는 문제를 가져오게 했다. 
특히 이는 소규모 영화나 독립영화, 예술영화의 상영권을 침해하고 
상업영화 및 블록버스터들의 지나친 독식 현상을 야기하기에 
이르렀다. 
 
이에 이 논문에서는 영화 산업의 소개와 배급 및 상영 시장의 
특징과 규모를 살펴본 뒤 수직계열화로 인한 멀티플렉스의 최적 
행위를 살펴보고 실제 데이터를 가지고 회귀분석을 통해 이러한 
수직계열화로 인한 차별이 존재하는지에 대해서 살펴보고자 한다. 
 
대부분의 한국 영화산업의 연구들이 스크린쿼터에 초점을 맞추고 
있거나 독점 과점의 정책적 규제적 측면에서 살펴보고 있는 바 
통계적, 경제학적인 분석을 통해 좀 더 직접적인 분석이 가능할 
것이라고 기대하고 있다. 
 
…………………………………… 
주요어 : 영화산업, 수직계열화, 수직적통합, 멀티플렉스, 배급, 
상영 







I really appreciate to professor Oyvind for everything. He gave 
guidance and taught so many things that it was all his help to 
finish this paper. And really grateful to have patience that I’m 
not smart and not good at speaking English but he is always 
gentle and encourages not giving up. I will really study hard so 
next time I’ll definitely write better one. 
2012년 마지막을 보내면서 너무나 힘들었던 시간들이었고 
모든 걸 다 포기하고 싶었지만 마지막 마무리만큼은 해야 
한다는 마음으로 어설프게나마 여기까지 온 것 같습니다. 
저의 지도교수님이었던 Oyvind Thomassen 교수님께 정말 
감사드립니다. 영어도 잘 하지 못하면서 너무나 느렸고 
서툴렀던 저를 그래도 참고 지도해주셔서 감사합니다. 더 
열심히 해 지금보다 더 멋진 모습 보여드리고 싶습니다. 
지금의 자신을 안다는 건 부끄러운 일이라고 생각하지만 
분명 여기서부터 다시 시작할 수 있는 것도 있다 생각하기에 
새롭게 자신을 다잡고 지금까지 저를 지지해준 저의 
가족들과 친구들에게도 감사의 말을 전합니다. 또 저의 
멘토가 되어주신 김영식 교수님께도 정말 감사드립니다. 
비록 지금은 형편없어도 언젠가는 제대로 혼자 설 수 있는 
모습을 보여드릴 수 있도록 노력하겠습니다. 감사합니다. 
 
